If the (un)trustworthy are rare, people will talk about them, making their detection more reliable and / or less costly. When, however, both types appear in large numbers, detecting (un)trustworthiness will be considerably more difficult and possibly too costly. (2000) we analyze how the composition of a population of trustworthy, resp. untrustworthy individuals evolves if the cost and reliability of type detection depend on the population composition.
Introduction
If virtuous behavior prevails a rare misdeed will draw attention. It will become a matter of gossip and widely known. This knowledge will influence the behavior of others in encounters with the norm violator. If nearly everybody is misbehaving, the rare trustworthy individual may raise a lot of interest, too. This behavior may become widely known as well and trigger responses. In short, bad as well as good conduct may stand out in a crowd of behavior of the other kind. It will easily be observed and thereby causally influence the behavior of observers (see on such mechanisms from a social science point of view Coleman, J. S. (1988) , from a normative perspective Urmson, J. O. (1958) ).
Since memory capacity is costly and limited there are obvious informational reasons why type detection should be less costly for given reliability or more reliable for given cost: A complete description of the population based on agents' past behaviour (e.g. "all agents except … are trustworthy") requires less memory or is more easily transmitted and accessed if the minority, which needs to be enumerated, is smaller. Identification heuristics of a given complexity (cost), aiming at an incomplete but still useful description of the population by rules of thumb such as "one cannot trust those with yellow scarves (black shoes, etc.)", can ceteris paribus be more accurate the less individuals need to be singled out. Conversely, less complex rules can be used to achieve a desired reliability.
To study the population dependency of detecting virtue we focus on the virtue of being trustworthy, respectively of failing to show this moral quality. By showing trust the trustor aims at reaching a payoff dominant result as compared to the status quo of no trust but makes himself vulnerable to an act of "exploitation" by the trustee. Trustworthiness is modelled as a modification of the preferences of the trustee. As a result of this modification (due to some kind of intrinsic motivation) the trustee evaluates results in ways other than suggested by objective or material outcomes that reflect reproductive success in the context of the evolutionary model. Intrinsic "moral motivations" prevent the trustworthy trustee from exploiting the trustor, whereas the untrustworthy individuals will not refrain from exploitation should they be trusted.
We assume that to limit their risk, trustors can invest in type detection. Utilizing such a technology they receive a more or less reliable signal whose reliability and cost are, however, not constant as in Güth and Kliemt (2000) but rather population dependent.
1 An extension of our analysis explicitly allows the reliability of the signal of another's type to depend on how the population is composed. More specifically, we assume that the signal's reliabilities (one has to distinguish the signal's reliability when resulting from the trustworthy and the untrustworthy) become worse when the relative frequencies of both virtue types converge.
Before analyzing this phenomenon we investigate what to expect when constant reliabilities for more symmetrically composed populations require higher costs of detection.
On a more abstract level, our analysis is comparable to evolutionary studies assuming that the rules of the game change when (average) population play changes. So, for instance, Joosten, Brenner and Witt (2003) are studying games whose payoff parameters depend also on past play. In principle, we do the same but do not presuppose such dependency but rather focus on an institutional aspect, the population dependency of reliability and cost of detection, which 1 One could also have assumed that not only the cost of investing in type detection is population dependent (in the sense of being lower the more one type prevails) but that also the strength of preference modifications depends on how the population is composed. If, for instance, feelings of guilt increase when one is the rare untrustworthy, this should stabilize universal trustworthiness. Similarly, if feelings of guilt get weaker when untrustworthiness becomes more widespread, a monomorphic society of potential exploiters should be stable.
the interacting parties could even render unimportant, e.g. in our situation at hand by not investing in type detection.
Section 2 describes the basic setup more formally. The rational decision behavior for all possible compositions of the population with (un)trustworthy individuals is derived in section 3. In the tradition of the indirect evolutionary approach we then assess the (reproductive) success of the (un)trustworthy type. Assuming success monotonic evolutionary dynamics we determine in section 4 the evolutionarily stable population compositions and their basins of attraction. Section 5 concludes.
The model
To capture the trust problem in social interaction, we rely on the trust game in Figure 1 with the same parameter normalization as in Güth and Kliemt (2000) The actual play of the trust game is embedded in a more complex decision process. Assuming an infinite population with random matching (for an alternative see Güth, Güth and Kliemt, 2002 ) the selected pair of individuals i and ( ) j i ≠ confronts the following decision process:
• The two individuals independently decide between investing (y), resp. not investing (n) in type detection where cost
of choosing y is population dependent. Clearly, such a cost function has the property that rare types are more cheaply found out due to ( ) • Chance assigns roles independently of player type, i.e. either individual i becomes player 1 and j player 2 or vice versa, each with probability 1/2.
• Player 1 decides between N (no trust, which would end the interaction with what may be seen as the status quo payoffs) or T (trust, which may be seen as an invitation to cooperate). If player 1 has chosen y before, he can base his decision on a type signal m of player 2's true m-type. The reliability of that signal is determined by two parameters • In case of 1's decision for T, player 2 finally chooses between E and R.
Note that modifying the order of moves and letting players decide between y and n when actually being in the role 1 of trustor would merely divide detection costs C(p) by 2, without any other changes. In the setting envisioned here it may seem more natural, though, to assume that detection costs are borne as a kind of sunk cost beforehand. People either bear the costs
of following up what is going on in the group or not. When they by chance encounter a potential partner they must decide "on the spot" whether or not to engage him in a cooperative venture by showing trust or not.
The payoffs are the ones in Figure 2 minus the costs C(p) of type detection for the individual(s) having chosen y. These (phenotypical) payoffs determine the optimal decision behavior in the process above which will be derived in section 3. Compared to this the composition of types, i.e. the evolution of the population composition parameter
governed by the (genotypical) success of the m , resp. m − types as determined by rational interaction. This success follows from payoff by setting m = 0. We will analyze the evolutionarily stable population compositions p in section 4.
Rational play as depending on the population composition
Player 2's behavior will depend on his type whenever he is asked to move, i.e. after the move T by player 1. More specifically, an m -type would choose E and an m − type R. 
plus a constant term capturing payoff in case the considered agent is allocated to the role of player 2 (which cannot be influenced by the agent's n or y-decision). Investigating when (*) exceeds pr/2 for p>s/r, and s/2 respectively for p<s/r, it follows that y is better than n (or at least as good) for the subinterval ( ) 
holds at p=s/r, i.e.
at the peak of the m − type will earn r materially whereas an m − type earns more and is thus more successful.
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The evolution of the population composition
Hence for / p s r ≥ , any monotonic evolutionary dynamics imply that p decreases as long as / p s r ≥ (and n is optimal).
Suppose that due to this decrease, p, at some point, starts to satisfy / p s r < . Then player 1 chooses N, and both m-types fare equally. But even then, if there are "trembles" in the sense of rare unintentional choices by player 1, the decline of p will continue (see Selten, 1983 Selten, , 1988 , for the justification of such rare trembles). This goes on until either * 0 p = is reached or until p arrives in the range where
and y becomes optimal.
So, consider population compositions p satisfying ( The reverse of (**) is true when m − types are likely to be mistaken for a trustworthy − m type (low µ ) and can then realize a substantial gain (high 1-s). Then m − types fare universally better and p will sooner or later -faster when 
Therefore, of the two solutions of the quadratic equation 
, p C p p C p is empty and p would decrease (fast or slow) throughout. If the condition holds, however, we know that (
and that p will increase from 0 p to a new level t p , for which one repeats the analysis. 
Accordingly there exists a threshold D determining whether an initial population composition Dynamics for given population-dependent costs C(p) are illustrated in Figure 4 . The solid line indicates comparatively "fast" movement, corresponding to a strict payoff (dis)advantage of trustworthy agents. Movement along the dotted line is "slow" because it is driven by mutations, i.e. agents in the role of player 1 who by mistake trust and then make trustworthy agents in the role of player 2 fare worse than others (who take advantage of the mistake).
Figure 4 It can easily be seen that a stronger sensitivity of investment costs C(p) on the population composition, i.e. a higher coefficient k, increases D and thus the basin of attraction of
At the same time, it also decreases * p . Thus, if the costs of type detection rise faster as the rarer m-type gets less rare (cost are "more" population dependent), the chances of a bimorphic population are worsened and the bimorphic population will on average be less
virtuous. The effect of c, i.e. of the fixed cost parameter, has already been discussed by Güth and Kliemt (2000, see also their discussion of the reliability parameters µ and µ ).
Extensions
Above baseline model of population-dependent detection costs lends itself to a number of variations and extensions. First, it was based on a specific, simple functional form of C(p).
Many plausible alternatives to the quadratic shape (which has great analytical convenience) exist. One example is a bell shaped form that reflects that costs may initially increase only slowly as more and more (un)trustworthy individuals are added to a population dominanted by m − types ( m − types). This case in fact allows for multiple stable polymorphic population states, as illustrated in Figure 5 , where of the six intersection points of ( ) those with more or less equal payoff parameters as defining the interaction structure in Section 2) reveal different positive population shares of (un)trustworthy individuals, solely since they started out differently. It also suggests a new kind of policy for improving the trustworthiness of a society which, in view of our analysis, we can describe as "watershed jumping". A policy measure should aim at restarting the evolutionary p-process above the lower watershed of the better bimorphism. Note, however, that we cannot justify a p=1-monomorphism (except by trivially assuming 1 μ μ = = and C(1)=0), see also Fn. 1 above), and can never rule out a p*=0-monomorphism. It seems that we cannot live without some untrustworthy ones and have to expect only them when starting out with too few trustworthy members of society. If so there is, however, the chance of "watershed jumping", i.e. of policy trying to inspire an evolutionary increase of p, which might have to be repeated to reach the best possible bimorphism in the sense of a maximally stable population share of trustworthy individuals. 
Conclusions
Quite generally, the resources of a habitat will depend on how it is inhabited (possibly by more than just one species (see Aumann and Güth, 2000) . If, for instance, a habitat is overused, it may not be sustainable what might even endanger the species which rely on it.
Here the habitat changes concern only how costly it is to obtain a signal on the other's (un)trustworthiness and how reliable the signals are. Our assumption that type detection becomes easier the more monomorphic the population could be turned around by stating that the habitat becomes more difficult when both, the trustworthy and the untrustworthy ones, are equally numerous. In this sense our rather specific analysis can be more broadly interpreted as one where the population composition and the quality of the habitat are coevolving. Unlike in the former study of Güth and Kliemt (2000) this allows for multiple stable bimorphisms and enriches the spectrum of explanations why societies may differ in the type composition and of possible policy measures to improve the trustworthiness in society.
